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THE RHETORICAL USES OF MARBURY v. MADISON:
THE EMERGENCE OF A "GREAT CASE"
Davison M. Douglas*

Marbury v. Madison is today indisputably one of the "great
cases" of American constitutional law because of its association
with the principle of judicial review. But for much of its
history, Marbury has not been regarded as a seminal decision.
Between 1803 and 1887, the Supreme Court never once cited
Marbury for the principle of judicial review, and nineteenthcentury constitutional law treatises were far more likely to cite
Marbury for the decision's discussion of writs of mandamus or
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction than for its
discussion of judicial review. During the late nineteenth
century, however, the exercise of judicial review became far
more controversial. Proponents of judicial review seized upon
the Marbury decision to legitimize their claims for an expansive
conception of the doctrine-particularly after the Court engaged
in an extraordinarily controversial exercise ofjudicial review in
1895 in the Pollock decisions declaring the newly enacted
federal income tax unconstitutional. In the process, Marbury
became, for the first time, a "great case"-as measured by its
treatment in judicial opinions, legal treatises, and case booksa moniker that would have been ill applied to the decision for
most of the nineteenth century. Marbury's significance today
cannot be attributed to the pathbreaking character of the
decision. Rather, Marbury became "great" because proponents
of an expansive doctrine of judicial review have needed it to
assume greatness.

During the past year, several law schools have held conferences
to commemorate the bicentennial of the Supreme Court's 1803
decision in Marbury v. Madison. 1
The prevalence of these

* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of
Rights Law, William and Mary School of Law. I thank Jennifer Becker, Sherri
Campbell, Michael Gentry, and Shawn Gobble for their research assistance,
and Neal Devins, Charles Hobson, and Michael Klarman for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). These law schools include Georgetown,
George Washington, John Marshall, Maryland, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wake
Forest.
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conunemorations is not surprising. Marbury is widely regarded
today as the most important case in American constitutional
history. 2
These conunemorations are not the first celebrations of the
greatness of the Marbury decision. A century ago, Marbury enjoyed
similar glowing attention. At the centennial celebration of Chief
Justice John Marshall's appointment in 1901, speaker after speaker
waxed eloquent about the sublime virtues of Marshall's Marbury
decision. "If an addition is ever made to the number of days
celebrated as national anniversaries," Harvard law professor
Jeremiah Smith exclaimed, "I submit that the twenty-fourth of
February [the date of the Marbury decision] may well be added to
the list."3 Arkansas Judge U.M. Rose claimed that "[n]ext to the
formation of our government the decision in Marbury v. Madison is
perhaps the most important event in our history.')'! California
lawyer Horace Platt characterized Marbury "as great a document as
the Bill of Rights, as far-reaching as the Declaration of
Independence, as essential to the healthy development of our
Government under the Constitution as the Constitution itself."5
This praise for Marbury was not directed at the decision's treatment
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction or its discussion of the
proper uses of writs of mandamus. Rather, these proponents of the
glories of Marbury focused on the decision's discussion of the
principle of judicial review.
Yet this glowing praise of Marbury in 1901 bore a certain irony.
The Supreme Court itself, during the prior century, had rarely even
cited Marbury's discussion of judicial review. Between 1803 and
1887, the Court never once cited Marbury for the proposition of
judicial review, even when the Court issued highly controversial
decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sandford6 or the Civil Rights Cases 7
2. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (calling Marbury "the most famous case in our
history"); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES! 200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW:
MILESTONES IN OUR LEGAL HISTORY vi-vii (1976) (1974 American Bar
Association poll of lawyers, judges, and law professors ranks Marbury u.
Madison as the most important Supreme Court ruling in American history).
3. 1 JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 141 (John
F. Dillon ed., 1903) [hereinafter LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES].
4. 3 id. at 130.
5. 3 id. at 231.
6. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The controversial nature of the Dred
Scott decision is beyond dispute.
7. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases
outraged blacks throughout the nation, particularly in the North. The decision
prompted the establishment of new civil rights organizations across the North
(including two hundred in Ohio alone), and led to the enactment of anti-
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striking down important congressional legislation.
Indeed, a
perusal of the Court's use of Marbury during the nineteenth century
suggests that the decision had far greater importance for its
discussion of writs of mandamus or the Court's original jurisdiction
than for its discussion of judicial review. Similarly, an examination
of nineteenth-century constitutional law treatises suggests that
most legal scholars did not regard Marbury as a seminal decision
establishing the principle of judicial review. In fact, nineteenthcentury treatises were more likely to cite Marbury as authority on
questions pertaining to writs of mandamus, executive power, or the
Court's original jurisdiction, than for the principle of judicial
•
8
reVIew.
But during the late nineteenth century, the issue of judicial
review became ensnared with the highly contentious public debate
over state regulation of private economic affairs-particularly
regulation designed to ameliorate the effects of industrialization,
corral the power of concentrated wealth, and protect the interests of
labor. Many conservative legal scholars, jurists, and politicians
urged the courts to exercise judicial review more aggressively in
order to curb reform efforts that interfered with private property
and contract rights. Many reformers, on the other hand, attacked
the courts for thwarting the will of the people through judicial
review and establishing a "judicial oligarchy."
Proponents of judicial review during the late nineteenth century
seized upon the Marbury decision and its author, Chief Justice John
Marshall, to legitimize their claims for an expansive conception of
the doctrine-particularly after the Court engaged in an
extraordinarily controversial exercise of judicial review in 1895,
declaring the newly enacted federal income tax unconstitutional.9 In
the struggle to defend the Court's actions, judicial review
enthusiasts elevated the Marbury decision-and Chief Justice John
Marshall-to icon status to fend off attacks that the Court had acted
in an unwarranted fashion. In the process, Marbury became, for the
first time, a "great case"-as measured by its treatment in judicial
opinions, legal treatises, and casebooks-a moniker that would have
discrimination legislation in eleven northern and western states within two
years. Davison M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1541, 1555 (2002); Valeria W. Weaver, The Failure of Civil Rights 18751883 and Its Repercussions, 54 J . NEGRO HIST. 368, 373-75 (1969).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 34-46.
9. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895) (holding
unconstitutional tax on income derived from real estate), modified, 158 U.S.
601, 637 (1895) (extending principle of earlier decision to income derived from
personal property and thereby declaring unconstitutional the entire 1894
graduated income tax).
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been ill applied to the decision for most of the nineteenth century.
During the twentieth century, particularly after the onset of the
Warren Court, the exercise of judicial review has remained
controversial. Once again, Marbury has been deployed in the debate
over judicial review. During the past half century, justices on the
Court in high-profile exercises of judicial review of both legislation
and executive action have increasingly called upon Marbury to
justifY their actions, far more frequently than at any time in the
Court's history. For both conservative and liberal justices, Marbury
has become an important rhetorical tool in the ongoing debate about
the Court's proper role in American constitutional government. But
the justices have used Marbury not only to defend judicial review in
controversial cases. They have also embraced Marbury for other
instrumental purposes-in particular, to make the Court's
interpretations of constitutional text preeminent over those of other
governmental actors, a move that constituted an extension of
Marbury itself.
Today, Marbury u. Madison is regarded as the central decision
in the canon of American constitutional law. But its greatness rests
not on its intrinsic qualities as a legal decision nor on its historical
significance in 1803. Rather, Marbury enjoys greatness because the
doctrine with which it is so intimately associated-judicial reviewhas become such a significant feature of our constitutional structure.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW PRIOR TO MARBURY
Although many lawyers and law students view Marbury as
establishing the principle of judicial review, in fact, judicial review
enjoyed considerable support prior to John Marshall's 1803
10
decision. Even prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a
few state courts had either exercised judicial review or conceded the
legitimacy of the principle, 11 though this early use of judicial review

10. For a recent and persuasive summary of the evidence for the acceptance
of judicial review prior to Marbury, see Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were
the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1113-17 (2001).
11. See, e.g., Holmes v. Walton (N.J. 1780) (court holds a state statute
providing for jury with six members in violation of state constitution); Rutgers
v. Waddington (Mayor's Ct., City of N.Y. 1784) (court stated in dicta that a state
statute violated the law of nations and a treaty with Great Britain); Bayard v.
Singleton, 1 Martin 42 (N.C. 1787) (court strikes down a state confiscation law
relating to loyalist property); Trevett v. Weedon (Super. Ct. of R.I. 1786) (court
refuses to hear a prosecution of defendant for refusing to accept paper money as
legal tender; decision was widely understood as holding invalid state law
providing for issuance of paper money as legal tender); Commonwealth v.
Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 5, 8 (1782) (court strikes down Virginia statute granting
pardon, noting that if the "whole legislature . . . should attempt to overleap the
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was not widespread and in some instances highly controversial. 12 At
the 1787 Convention and the state ratifying debates, the framers
discussed judicial review, with supporters of the concept
outnumbering opponents. 13
During the 1790s, the use of judicial review became more
common. Some state courts, particularly in Virginia, continued to
strike down statutes under state constitutions. 14 Moreover, a few
bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I, in administering the public justice
of the country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and,
pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of your
authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further"). These cases, except for
Holmes v. Walton, are reproduced in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55-80 (1894). For a discussion of these and other pre-1787
judicial review cases, see CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88-112 (1959); CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF
JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 63-64 (1996); CHARLES WARREN,
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 43-50 (1935); Austin
Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456
(1899); William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of
Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994).
12. For example, when a New York Mayor's Court in 1784 suggested in
dicta the principle of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, see
supra note 11, the decision provoked a sharp rebuke from the New York
General Assembly which attacked the decision as "subversive of good order and
the sovereignty of the state," and leading "directly to anarchy and confusion."
HAINES, supra note 11, at 101-03; L.B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 26
POL. SCI. Q. 238, 245-46 (1911). In Rhode Island, after the justices of the
Superior Court rendered a decision perceived as holding a state statute
unconstitutional, see supra note 11, the General Assembly directed the justices
in question to appear before the Assembly to explain their decision; in the next
election, all but one of the justices were defeated. HAINES, supra note 11, at
109-12; Boudin, supra, at 246-47.
13. Klarman, supra note 10, at 1114. Among the supporters were Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts, who noted that "[i]n some States, the Judges had
actually set aside laws as being against the Constitution. This was done too
with general approbation." WARREN, supra note 11, at 50. Luther Martin
suggested that "[a]s to the constitutionality of laws, that point will come before
the Judges in their proper official character." Id. Charles Warren counted
twenty-two other members of the Constitutional Convention as expressing
support for judicial review either contemporaneous with the Convention or
within a few years thereafter. Id. at 50-51; see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 1982) (asserting the duty of the
courts "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution
void"). By the same token, Warren reports that only four members of the
Convention were clear opponents to judicial review. WARREN, supra note 11, at
51.

14. See, e.g., Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793). But not
everyone embraced this use of judicial review. In 1807 and 1808, judges in Ohio
were impeached for holding acts of the Ohio state legislature unconstitutional.
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
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lower federal courts struck down state statutes as violative of the
federal Constitution, decisions which provoked minimal adverse
response. 15 All of the Supreme Court justices, while riding circuit,
assumed the power of judicial review in Rayburn's Case 16 in 1792.
In 1795, Justice William Paterson in Vanhorne's Lessee v.
Dorrance, 17 also while riding circuit, declared a Pennsylvania statute
18
to be unconstitutional.
In Hylton v. United States, 19 the Court
refused to resolve a case on the basis of judicial review, but
nevertheless signaled the Court's acknowledgment of the legitimacy
of the theory. 20 When the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures
threatened nullification of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 as
unconstitutional, five of the seven states that responded argued that
only courts could nullify unconstitutional legislation. 21 Leading
theorists, such as James Kent, championed judicial review during
the 1790s.22
Thus, by the time of Marbury, the principle of judicial review
was reasonably well established. Not surprisingly, the judicial
review aspect of the Marbury decision received little notice,
suggesting that Marshall's claims with respect to the authority of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 133-34 (1893).
15. Klarman, supra note 10, at 1115.
16. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER
ELLSWORTH 175-78 (1995); Klarman, supra note 10, at 1115-16.
17. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
18. Id. at 320 ("The confirming act is unconstitutional and void.").
19. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
20. CASTO, supra note 16, at 101-05; Klarman, supra note 10, at 1115-16;
see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring)
("If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those
constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void ....").
21. Klarman, supra note 10, at 1116. Those states were Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. FrankL. Peckham, Is
the Supreme Court Guilty of "Usurpation"?, in CONGRESS OR THE SUPREME
COURT: WHICH SHALL RULE AMERICA? 251-52 (Egbert Ray Nichols ed., 1935).
22. Kent, in his inaugural lecture at King's College in 1794, assumed the
legitimacy of judicial review:
No question can be made with us, but that the acts of the
legislative body, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the
Constitution, ought to be absolutely null and void. The only inquiry
which can arise in the subject is, whether the legislature is not of
itself the competent judge of its own constitutional limits . . . or
whether the business of determining . . . is not rather the fit and
exclusive province of the courts of justice .... The courts of justice
which are organized with peculiar advantages to exempt them from
the baneful influence of faction ... are ... the most proper power in
the government to keep the legislature within the limits of its duty,
and to maintain the authority of the Constitution.
James Kent, Kent's Introductory Lecture, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 335-36 (1903).
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the courts to assess the constitutionality of legislation was not
controversial. Indeed, critics of the decision, including Thomas
Jefferson, directed their ire not at the decision's exercise of judicial
23
review, but rather at the separation of powers implications of the
suggestion that the Court might issue a writ of mandamus to a
Cabinet official. That the discussion of judicial review in Marbury
would someday cause the decision to be considered "the most famous
case in our history''24 could not have been predicted in 1803.
II. MARBURY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Not surprisingly, Marbury was not considered a "great case"
during most of the nineteenth century, a time of limited judicial
review by the Supreme Court. The notion of judicial review of
congressional statutes was not controversial during the Marshall or
Taney courts, in significant measure because of its sparing use. 25 As
Daniel Farber notes in his contribution to this Symposium, the
Supreme Court's decisions demarking the relationship between the
Court and the states proved far more controversial during the
antebellum era than did Marbury's assertion of the right of the
Court to assess the constitutionality of a congressional statute. 26
Moreover, prior to the Civil War, the Court received more criticism
for the deference it showed Congress in cases such as McCulloch v.
Maryland,'2:7 than for its use of judicial review to void congressional
legislation in Marbury. Between 1803 and 1864, the Supreme Court
struck down only one congressional statute-portions of the 1820
Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott28-a decision in which the Court
23. ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
102 (1989) (noting that the Court's exercise of judicial review in Marbury was
"either approved or ignored"); HOWARD E. DEAN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
DEMOCRACY 27 (1966) (noting that "even the most bitterly partisan Jeffersonian
newspapers did not attack Marshall's assertion of the power of judicial review");
Klarman, supra note 10, at 1117 (noting that "Marshall's critics had no gripe
with him" for exercising judicial review in Marbury). To be sure, judicial review
would remain controversial in a few states after the Marbury decision. For
example, after Marbury, state court judges in both Ohio and Rhode Island were
impeached (though not removed) for refusing to enforce unconstitutional
statutes. During the 1820s, Kentucky was roiled by a series of efforts,
eventually unsuccessful, to impeach judges who declared state statutes
unconstitutional. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at
143-44.
24. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
25. CLINTON, supra note 23, at 161.
26. See Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and Its Alternatives: An
American Tale, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415, 417 (2003).
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
28. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857).
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failed to even mention Marbury.
The Court also declared
unconstitutional many state laws during the antebellum era, but
again without explicitly relying upon the Marbury decision. To the
extent that the Court cited Marbury at all during the antebellum
era, it did so for the decision's discussion of writs of mandamus or
original jurisdiction, not judicial review. 29
After the Civil War, the Court began to use judicial review to
strike down federal and state legislation more frequently. Between
1865 and 1894, the Court declared congressional statutes
unconstitutional in nineteen decisions. 30 In none of those nineteen
exercises of judicial review did the Court cite Marbury. 31 By the
same token, between 1865 and 1898, the Court struck down 171
state laws; 32 again, the Court cited Marbury for the principle of
judicial review in none of those cases. 33 The Supreme Court did cite
Marbury approximately fifty times between 1803 and 1894, but in
almost all of those decisions the Court cited Marbury on issues
pertaining to writs of mandamus or the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction.
In a similar fashion, nineteenth-century legal scholars, for the
most part, did not emphasize the connection between Marbury and
the principle of judicial review.
The two most significant
constitutional law treatises of the early nineteenth century, by
James Kent and Joseph Story, did cite Marbury for establishing the
proposition of judicial review. 34 Most subsequent constitutional law
29. As Robert Clinton has noted, during the antebellum era, the Supreme
Court "regarded Marbury v. Madison as having settled either a narrow
jurisdictional question or a technical issue relating to the mandamus remedy."
CLINTON, supra note 23, at 162.
30. WILFRED C. GILBERT, PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2-29 (Univ.
Publ'ns of Am. 1975) (1936); WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE
ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87 (2000).
31. Moreover, in none of those cases did the Court cite any prior decision to
justify its exercise of judicial review, suggesting the noncontroversial nature of
the doctrine.
32. CLINTON, supra note 23, at 162.
33. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), however, the Court, though it
sustained the constitutionality of a Kansas statute prohibiting the manufacture
and sale of liquor, did, citing Marbury, reaffirm its authority to assess the
constitutionality of state legislation. The decision in Mugler is the first time
that the Court ever cited Marbury in connection with the principle of judicial
review of legislation.
34. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 424 (Bernard D.
Reams, Jr. ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1984) (1826) (claiming that "[t]he power
and duty of the judiciary to disregard an unconstitutional act of congress, or of
any state legislature, were declared" in Marbury); 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH PRELIMINARY
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treatises, however, did not. A perusal of nineteenth-century
constitutional law treatises published after Kent and Story suggests
that Marbury's significance lay in its discussion of writs of
mandamus and the Court's original jurisdiction, not its treatment of
the principle of judicial review.
Former Columbia president William Alexander Duer, for
example, in his 1856 revised edition of his 1843 treatise
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States, while discussing
the judicial power, made the assertion that "[i]f an Act of Congress
be repugnant to the Constitution, it is ipso facto void; and the
Courts have the power, and it is their duty so to declare it."35 Duer
then cited more than sixty decisions in which state or federal courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, had declared either
congressional statutes, state statutes, or state constitutional
provisions inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.36 Remarkably,
Marbury is absent from Duer's lengthy list of cases in which courts
had exercised judicial review of legislation. In fact, Duer's only
mention of Marbury is in connection with a discussion of the original
37
jurisdiction of the Court.
Thomas Cooley, an enthusiastic proponent of judicial review, in
his influential 1868 treatise Constitutional Limitations38 devoted
thirty pages to a consideration "Of the Circumstances Under Which
a Legislative Enactment May Be Declared Unconstitutional"
without ever discussing or even mentioning Marbury even though
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 701 (1833) (citing Marbury for the "duty
of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or a
state legislature void"). But for an early nineteenth-century treatise that did
not associate Marbury with judicial review, see BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE
RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN: WITH A COMMENTARY ON STATE RIGHTS, AND ON
THE CONSTITUTION AND POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 123-24 (Books for
Libraries Press 1970) (1832) (citing Marbury briefly only in connection with a
discussion of writs of mandamus).
35. WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 126 (2d ed. 1856).
Duer's treatise was based on lectures that he had delivered each year to
students at Columbia. I d. at xi.
36. ld. at 126 n.l.
37. Id. at 138-39.
38. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION (1868) [hereinafter COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS]. Cooley was an enormously influential legal scholar, educator,
and jurist and his treatise was the most cited commentary on constitutional law
of the latter half of the nineteenth century. BENJAMIN R. TwiSS, LAWYERS AND
THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ F AIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 34 (Russell
& Russell, Inc. 1962) (1942).
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he did discuss many other cases involving exercises of judicial
39
Moreover, in his 1880 The General Principles of
review.
Constitutional Law in the United States of America, essentially a
student constitutional law hornbook, Cooley also downplayed
Marbury's relevance to judicial review, citing the case only in
connection with discussions of the authority of executive officers,
presidential commissions, the Court's original jurisdiction, and the
ability of judicial process to reach the President. 4° Cooley did
discuss judicial review in this hornbook, claiming that "the judiciary
is the final authority in the construction of the Constitution and the
laws, and its construction should be received and followed by the
other departments," but did not cite Marbury as authority for that
proposition. 41
Other treatises published during the second half of the
nineteenth century also ignored the Marbury decision in their
discussion of judicial review. John Norton Pomeroy, dean of the law
school at New York University, in his 1868 treatise An Introduction
to the Constitutional Law of the United States, cited Marbury only in
connection with writs of mandamus and the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction, not in connection with judicial review.42 To
support his claim that "the national Judiciary is the final arbiter as
to the meaning of the Constitution," and possesses the power to
assess "the validity of a statute of Congress or of a state legislature,"
Pomeroy cited four Supreme Court decisions, but not Marbury. 43
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller, who served on the Court
from 1862 until his death in 1890, described Marbury in an 1889
lecture as a "very lengthy, and an exhaustive discussion of the
power of a court of law to compel officers by the writ of mandamus
to discharge duties which it is clear they are bound to perform, and
in regard to which they have no discretion."44 Justice Miller, whose
39. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note
38, at 159-88. Cooley, in another section of his treatise, did cite Marbury on one
occasion-as one of the "very numerous authorities upon the subject" of the
"right and the power of the courts" to assess the constitutionality of legislative
pronouncements. Id. at 45-46 & n.l. In subsequent editions of his famous
treatise published over the course of the next thirty years, Cooley gave the
Marbury decision no greater emphasis.
40. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 115, 119, 128-29, 175-76 (Andrew C.
McLaughlin ed., 3d ed. 1898).
41. Id. at 158. In fact, Cooley offered no case support for this claim. Id.
42. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 419, 423, 516 (1868).
43. Id. at 95-96.
44. SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 385 (J.C. Bancroft Davis ed., 1891). This lecture was given in
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constitutional law lectures were published posthumously in 1891,
underscored the importance of the decision's treatment of writs of
mandamus issue:
The immense importance of this decision [Marbury] ... may be
appreciated when it is understood that the principles declared
. . . subjected the ministerial and executive officers of the
Government, all over the country, to the control of the courts,
in regard to the execution of a large part of their duties. Its
application to the very highest officers of the Government,
except perhaps the President himself, has been illustrated in
45
numerous cases in the courts of the United States . ...

But Justice Miller made no mention of the Marbury decision's
discussion of judicial review of legislation in his constitutional law
lectures.
As a final example of a nineteenth-century treatise that
understated the importance of Marbury, John Burgess, dean of the
faculty of political science at Columbia, published a two-volume
treatise in 1893, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional
Law, in which he discussed judicial review but without reference to
Marbury. Burgess cited Marbury only in his discussion of the
commissioning ofjudges and the Court's originaljurisdiction. 46
1889. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 360.
45. MILLER, supra note 44, at 386.
46. 2 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 322-23, 329 (1890).
One other nineteenth-century
constitutional law treatise writer who did not cite Marbury for the principle of
judicial review was University of Missouri law professor Christopher Tiedeman.
Tiedeman noted that "[w]henever an act of the legislature contravenes a
constitutional provision, it is void, and it is the duty of the courts so to declare
it." CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
STANDPOINT 5 (1886) [hereinafter TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF
THE POLICE POWER]. Tiedeman cited neither Marbury nor any other case for
that proposition.
To be sure, a few nineteenth-century constitutional law treatises did
cite Marbury for the principle of judicial review. Theodore Sedgewick's 1857
treatise, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional
Law, citing James Kent's Commentaries on American Law, supra note 34, noted
that "courts of justice ... have, since the earliest days of our republic, steadily
and vigorously applied" the doctrine of judicial review, and indicated that the
"doctrine may be considered as having been finally settled in Marbury us.
Madison." THEODORE SEDGEWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN
THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 216 (1857). In the context of discussing various exercises of judicial review
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Sedgewick also notes that
the "principle [of judicial review was] deliberately and definitively settled" in
Marbury. Id. at 479.
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In part, the dearth of references to Marbury in both judicial
opinions and constitutional law treatises reflected the fact that for
much of the nineteenth century, the issue of judicial review itself
was far less controversial than the issue of what its proper scope
should be. 47 Many treatises of the post-Civil War era, for example,
spent considerably more space discussing the question whether
courts should strike down statutes that offended notions of "natural
justice" as opposed to a specific constitutional provision,48 than they
did discussing the principle of judicial review itself.
III. MARBURYDURINGTHE POPULIST AND PROGRESSIVE ERAS
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
issue of judicial review became far more controversial, as courts
began to exercise judicial review far more frequently than ever
before. This expanded use of judicial review, in response to an array
of legislative reform efforts designed to ameliorate the effects of
rapid industrialization and to protect the interests of workers,
provoked intense controversy. Proponents of judicial review utilized
Marbury to defend their position. After ninety years of relative
insignificance as a decision associated with judicial review, Marbury
Columbia law professor John Ordronaux's 1891 Constitutional
Legislation in the United States, noted that "the laws of the United States,
themselves, are only valid when made in pursuance of the Constitution; and
any enactment, whether Federal or State, which is repugnant to it, is void,
being in violation of this fundamental law." JOHN 0RDRONAUX, CONSTITUTIONAL
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS ORIGIN, AND APPLICATION TO THE
RELATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS, AND OF STATE LEGISLATURES 210 (1891).
Ordronaux relies on Marbury for this proposition, along with five other cases,
including the Supreme Court's 1792 decision in Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
409 (1792).
/d. at 210 n.l.
Ordronaux, however, offered a limited
characterization of the doctrine of judicial review. Citing Marbury along with
several cases and treatises, he claimed that "the decisions of even our highest
courts are accepted as a finality only in relation to the particular cases with
which they happen to deal, and their judgments do not impose compulsory
limitations upon the action of any other department." /d. at 420.
47. NELSON, supra note 30, at 86-87 (noting that by the middle of the
nineteenth century, "judicial review had become an accepted feature of
American law . . . . With the doctrine firmly established, judges began to
exercise their power of review with greater frequency, and ... in a fashion that
involved them in substantial controversy.").
48. For example, both Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiedeman in their
treatises engaged in lengthy discussions of the question whether, in Tiedeman's
words, courts could "declare an act of the legislature void, because it violates
some abstract rule of justice, when there is no constitutional prohibition."
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER, supra note 46,
at 5-13; see also COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,
supra note 38, at 164-70.
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became an important precedent for courts and commentators
seeking to justify the exercise of judicial review. In the process,
Marbury became, for many, one of the "great cases" of American
constitutional law.
During the 1880s and early 1890s, a number of jurists and legal
scholars expressed alarm at the growth in state and federal
legislation regulating eccnomic affairs. University of Missouri law
professor Christopher Tiedeman, for example, in his influential1886
treatise Limitations of Police Power in the United States, wrote with
great passion about the dangers oflegislative excess:
Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant
throughout the civilized world. The State is called on to
protect the weak against the shrewdness of the stronger, to
determine what wages a workman shall receive for his labor,
and how many hours daily he shall labor.... The demands of
Socialists and Communists vary in degree and in detail, and
the most extreme of them insist upon the assumption by
government of the paternal character altogether....
Contemplating these extraordinary demands of the great
army of discontents, and their apparent power, with the
growth and development of universal suffrage, to enforce their
views of civil polity upon the civilized world, the conservative
classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an absolutism
more tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before
experienced by man, the absolutism of a democratic majority.
49

Supreme Court Justice David Brewer expressed similar
concerns about legislative excess in his 1892 dissenting opinion in
Budd v. New York/,o in which the Court upheld a New York statute
regulating the fees of grain elevators against a constitutional
challenge: "The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The
utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible
protection to him and his property, is both the limitation and duty of
government."51
49. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER, supra
note 46, at vi-vii.
50. 143 U.S. 517, 549-52 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 551. Other late nineteenth-century lawyers also expressed
concern about the excesses of legislatures. Former U.S. Senator Waitman
Willey of West Virginia addressed his state's bar association in 1887 and spoke
of the need for lawyers to impose "a wholesome check upon those tendencies to
licentiousness and disorder incident to popular institutions." ARNOLD M. PAUL,
CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH,
1887-1895, at 21 (1960). Similarly, Georgia attorney I.E. Shumate, in an 1887
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Both Tiedeman and Brewer called on courts to enforce both
constitutional and "natural rights" norms against legislative
excess. 52 In an 1887 lecture subsequently published in his 1890
book, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States, Tiedeman
articulated an expansive vision of "natural rights" which courts
must enforce against legislative encroachment:
Under the stress of economical relations, the clashing of
private interests, the conflicts of labor and capital, the old
superstition that government has the power to banish evil
from the earth . . . has been revived; and all these so-called
natural rights, which the framers of our constitutions declared
to be inalienable, and the violation of which they pronounced
to be a just cause for rebellion, are in imminent danger of
serious infringement....

In these days of great social unrest, we applaud the disposition
of the courts to seize hold of these general declaration of rights
as an authority for them to lay their interdict upon all
legislative acts which interfere with the individual's natural
rights, even though these acts do not violate any specific or
53
special provision of the Constitution ....

address to his state's bar association, worried about the increase in legislative
regulation of private affairs which he feared was "affecting the conduct of
almost every branch of business and controlling the private conduct of men in
all relations of life." !d. at 22. Shumate criticized the courts for their failure to
control this legislative activity. !d. at 22-23.
52. Tiedeman, for example, wrote:
[U]nder the written constitutions, Federal and State, democratic
absolutism is impossible in this country, as long as the popular
reverence for the constitutions, in their restrictions upon
governmental activity, is nourished and sustained by a prompt
avoidance by the courts of any violations of their provisions, in word
or in spirit.
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER, supra note 46,
at vii.
53. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-82 (1890) (emphasis added). Tiedeman went
on to define the scope of these "natural rights":
[T]he doctrine of natural rights may be tersely stated to be a freedom
from all legal restraint that is not needed to prevent injury to others;
... or, to employ the language of Herbert Spencer: "Every man has
freedom to do aught that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal
freedom of any other man."
!d. at 76 (footnote omitted) (quoting HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS; OR, THE
CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM
DEVELOPED 121 (1851)).
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Similarly, in 1893, in a speech to the New York State Bar
Association, Justice Brewer offered a robust defense of the role of
courts in the protection of individual liberty through judicial review.
Like Tiedeman, Brewer urged the courts to protect economic liberty
not just under the Constitution but also with reference to principles
of natural law:
The courts ... make no laws, they establish no policy, they
never enter into the domain of popular action. They do not
govern. Their functions in relation to the State are limited to
seeing that popular action does not trespass upon right and
54
justice as it exists in written constitutions and natural law.

During the 1880s and 1890s, many state courts began to
exercise judicial review more frequently, striking down state
legislation that infringed private contract and property rights. 55
These decisions delighted conservatives like Tiedeman and Brewer,
but dismayed social reformers, such as Populist James Weaver. 56 In
54. Quoted in CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW:
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 157 (rev. ed. 1994)
(emphasis added). See also David J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from
Public Attack, 256 YALE REV. 97, 103 (1891) (appealing to "natural justice" as
demanding protection for private property).
Other justices of the U.S. Supreme Court also appealed to natural law
principles to reject legislation. In Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888),
Justice Stephen Field dissented from the Court's decision upholding a
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargarine. Justice
Field argued in part that the statute impeded "[t]he right to pursue one's
happiness [which] is placed by the Declaration of Independence among the
inalienable rights of man, with which all men are endowed, not by ... force of
legislative or constitutional enactments, but by their Creator ...." Id. at 692.
55. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND
LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 26-27 (1994) (noting the
sharp increase between 1880 and 1900 in the number of state court decisions
striking down legislation); EdwardS. Corwin, The Extension of Judicial Review
in New York: 1783-1905, 15 MICH. L. REV. 281, 285 (1917) (noting that New
York state courts invalidated ninety-nine state statutes during the 1890s, more
than twice the number invalidated during any other decade of the nineteenth
century); Charles Grove Haines, History of Judicial Review, in CONGRESS OR
THE SUPREME COURT: WHICH SHALL RULE AMERICA?, supra note 21, at 70
(arguing that "the decade beginning in 1880 may be regarded as the dividing
line between the earlier stage when judicial review of legislative enactments
was of relatively minor significance and the later stage in which this practice
becomes one of the central and controlling features of the American system of
government"); James M. Rosenthal, Massachusetts Acts and Resolves Declared
Unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1 MAss. L.Q.
301, 303-15 (1916) (noting that of all the state statutes declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts between 1804
and 1915, twenty-eight percent were struck down during the 1890s).
56. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 55, at 27 (citing JAMES B. WEAVER, A CALL TO
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the meantime, lawyers and legal scholars during the 1880s and
1890s debated the proper scope of judicial review, debates that on
occasion involved competing interpretations of the Marbury
decision. 57 Finally, in 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly relied
on Marbury for the first time to justifY striking down legislation in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 58 The Pollock case would help
significantly elevate the status of Marbury in American
constitutional law.
During the early 1890s, Populists urged a graduated income tax
to meet the federal budget deficit. 59 Although the tax enacted in
August 1894 provided for only a two percent tax rate on incomes
above $4000, it provoked a vituperous response from opponents who
dismissed it as "class legislation" and ''war upon honest industry."60
United States Senator David Hill of New York described the tax as
the work of "anarchists, communists, and socialists."61 John Forrest
Dillon, a Wall Street lawyer, former state and federal judge, and
enthusiastic proponent of laissez faire, 62 characterized the tax as
"class legislation of the most pronounced and vicious type" and
argued that it was ''violative of the constitutional rights of the
property owner, subversive of the existing social polity, and
essentially revolutionary. ,,ro
Efforts were immediately launched to challenge the
constitutionality of the new income tax in court on the grounds that
it was a "direct tax" required under Article I of the Constitution to
be apportioned among the states based on population. Within
months, a legal challenge to the tax supported by several of the

ACTION (1892), which favored limits on judicial power, arguing that judicial
review "dethrones the people who should be Sovereign and enthrones an
oligarchy").
57. CLINTON, supra note 23, at 166-75.
58. 157 U.S. 429, 583 (holding unconstitutional tax on income derived from
real estate), modified, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (extending principle of the
earlier decision to income derived from personal property and thereby declaring
unconstitutional the entire 1894 graduated income tax).
59. For a discussion of the history of support and opposition to the income
tax, see Elmer Ellis, Public Opinion and the Income Tax, 1860-1900, 27 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 225 (1940).
60. ld. at 236-38.
61. Id. at 238.
62. Dillon was also the author of the late nineteenth-century's most
authoritative treatise on municipal bonds, Law of Municipal Corporations.
"Dillon's Rule" provided that cities were completely subject to the will of their
state legislatures and that federal courts were empowered to enforce this
subjection if state courts refused to do so. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR:
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 223 (1989).
63. PAUL, supra note 51, at 164.
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nation's leading attorneys made its way to the United States
Supreme Court. Joseph Choate, one of the lawyers who brought the
litigation challenging the tax, claimed in oral argument before the
Supreme Court that the tax was "communistic in its purposes and
tendencies, and is defended here upon principles as communistic,
socialistic . . . as ever have been addressed to any political assembly
in the world."64 Choate elaborated:
I have thought that one of the fundamental objects of all
civilized government was the preservation of the rights of
private property. I have thought that it was the very keystone
of the arch upon which all civilized government rests, and that
this once abandoned, everything was . . . in danger . . . .
According to the doctrines that have been propounded here
this morning, even that great fundamental principle has been
scattered to the winds.65

"I do not believe that any member of this court ever has sat or
ever will sit to hear and decide a case the consequences of which will
be so far-reaching as this," Choate claimed at the conclusion of his
oral argument, "not even the venerable member [Justice Stephen
Field] who survives from the early days of the civil war, and has sat
upon every question of reconstruction, of national destiny, of state
destiny that has come up during the last thirty years.'.oo If the Court
did not intercede, Choate warned, "this communistic march goes
on.'m
In closing his oral argument in the Pollock case, Choate
appealed to both Marbury and John Marshall for support,
something that litigants in many prior cases challenging the
constitutionality of legislation that infringed property and contract
rights had not done. 68 Choate urged the Court to act despite popular
64. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 532 (argument of
Joseph H . Choate), modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
65. ld. at 534 (argument of Joseph H. Choate).
66. Id. at 553 (argument of Joseph H. Choate).
67. Id. at 533 (argument of Joseph H. Choate).
68. In earlier cases involving challenges to the constitutionality of various
federal and state statutes, litigants had not used Marbury to bolster their case.
For example, the party challenging the constitutionality of a Kansas statute
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887), cited a number of cases in support of its argument for an exercise of
judicial review, including Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), but not
Marbury. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 15-16, 30, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887). In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), the plaintiff cited a number
of state court cases in support of its argument for an exercise of judicial review,
but also did not cite Marbury. Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 28-31, Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). For other cases in which parties challenging the
constitutionality of state legislation did not cite Marbury, see Brief for Plaintiff
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support for the statute:
[l]f it be true that a mighty army of sixty million citizens is
likely to be incensed by this decision, it is the more vital to the
future welfare of this country that this court again resolutely
and courageously declare, as Marshall did, that it has the
power to set aside an act of Congress violative of the
Constitution, and that it will not hesitate in executing that
power, no matter what the threatened consequences of popular
69
or populistic wrath may be.

The income tax appeared to be a constitutional exercise of
congressional power. In fact, the Court had previously-and
without dissent-sustained the use of an income tax promulgated
during the Civil War against an argument that it was a direct tax. 70
But in the two Pollock decisions of the spring of 1895-the first in
which the Court considered, among other issues, the

in Error, Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1891); Brief for Appellees, Kansas v.
Ziebold, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Admittedly, each of these cases involved the
constitutionality of state legislation for which a citation to Marbury might have
been less appropriate, but late nineteenth-century litigants challenging the
constitutionality of congressional legislation also failed to cite Marbury. See
briefs filed in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312
(1893); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678
(1887); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883); Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); United States v. Fox, 95
U.S. 670 (1878); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
69. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 553 (argument of Joseph H. Choate). Choate's
comments were in response to those of James C. Carter, who defended the
statute:
Nothing could be more unwise and dangerous-nothing more foreign
to the spirit of the Constitution-than an attempt to baffle and defeat
a popular determination by a judgment in a lawsuit. When the
opposing forces of sixty millions of people have become arrayed in
hostile political ranks upon a question which all men feel is not a
question of law, but of legislation, the only path of safety is to accept
the voice of the majority as final.
Id. at 531-32 (argument of James C. Carter).
70. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) ("Our conclusions
are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only
capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and
that the [income] tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the
category of an excise or duty."); see also Francis R. Jones, Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Company, 9 HARV. L. REV. 198, 198 (1895) (concluding that the
Court in Pollock "deliver[ed] an opinion in which is laid down a doctrine that is
contrary to what has been accepted as law for nearly one hundred years"). For
an excellent discussion of the Civil War income tax and the Court's
consideration of the constitutionality of that tax in Springer, see ROBERT
STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913, at 15-99 (1993).
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constitutionality of taxing income derived from real property and
the second in which the Court considered the constitutionality of
taxing income derived from personal property-the Court struck
down the income tax statute as an unconstitutional direct tax. The
conservative majority on the Court clearly viewed any type of
income tax as an attack on propertied interests. In his concurrence,
Justice Field thundered: "The present assault upon capital is but the
beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others, larger and
more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of the
poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and
bitterness."71 Justice John Marshall Harlan later commented that
Justice Field had "acted often like a mad man during the whole of
72
this contest about the income tax."
The Pollock dissenters were particularly vitriolic in their
characterization of the majority's actions. Justice Howell Jackson,
who had traveled from his Tennessee sickbed to hear reargument on
the personal property issue, labeled the Court's decision "the most
disastrous blow ever struck at the constitutional power of
Congress."73 (Jackson's dissent would be his last opinion; he would
74
be dead within three months. ) Justice Henry Brown characterized
the Court's decision as "nothing less than a surrender of the taxing
power to the moneyed class ... fraught with immeasurable danger
to the future of the country," and a decision that "approaches the
proportions of a national calamity ...."75 "It is certainly a strange
commentary upon the Constitution of the United States and upon a
democratic government," Brown charged, "that Congress has no
power to lay a tax which is one of the main sources of revenue of
nearly every civilized State . . . . I hope it may not prove the first
step toward the submergence of the liberties of the people in a
sordid despotism of wealth."76 Justice Harlan, pounding the bench

71. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 607 (Field, J., concurring).
72. David G. Farrelly, Justice Harlan's Dissent in the Pollock Case, 24 S.
CAL. L. REV. 175, 179 (1951).
73. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 706 (1895)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
74. PAUL, supra note 51, at 213.
75. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 695 (Brown, J., dissenting).
76. ld. Brown offered a different vision of judicial review than that
engaged in by the majority:
It is never a light thing to set aside the deliberate will of the
legislature, and in my opinion it should never be done, except upon
the clearest proof of its conflict with fundamental law. Respect for the
Constitution will not be inspired by a narrow and technical
construction which shall limit or impair the necessary powers of
Congress.
I d.
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with his fist while delivering his dissent, 77 called the decision "a
disaster to the country,"78 and predicted in a letter to his sons a few
weeks later that the decision ''will become as hateful with the
American people as the Dred Scott case was when it was decided
. . . . The recent decision will have the effect, if the country
recognizes it permanently as good law, to make the freemen of
America the slaves of accumulated wealth."79 Justice Edward White
rebuked his colleagues in the majority for ignoring clear precedent:
The conservation and orderly development of our institutions
rests on our acceptance of the results of the past, and their use
as lights to guide our steps in the future. Teach the lesson
that settled principles may be overthrown at any time, and
confusion and turmoil must ultimately result . . . . If the
permanency of [the Court's) conclusions is to depend upon the
personal opinions of those who, from time to time, may make
up its membership, it will inevitably become a theatre of
political strife, and its action will be without coherence or
' tency.80
conSlS

Faced with a popular piece of congressional legislation,81 a
unanimous precedent sustaining an earlier federal income tax, 82 and
bitter division within the Court, Chief Justice Melville Fuller called
upon the Marbury decision to defend the Court's questionable
exercise of judicial review. At the outset of his opinion for the Court
in the real property decision in the case, Fuller made a direct appeal
to Marbury:
Since the opinion in Marbury v. Madison ... was delivered, it
has not been doubted that it is within judicial competency, by
express provisions of the Constitution or by necessary
inference and implication, to determine whether a given law of
the United States is or is not made in pursuance of the
83
Constitution, and to hold it valid or void accordingly.

Fuller then proceeded to quote at length from Marshall's
opinion in Marbury:
"If," said Chief Justice Marshall, "both the law and the
77. Farrelly, supra note 72, at 177.
78. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 684 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Quoted in Farrelly, supra note 72, at 180.
80. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 650-51, modified,
158 U.S. 601 (1895).
81. According to one historian of the tax controversy, the 1894 income tax
was "unquestionably desired by a majority of the voters at that time." Ellis,
supra note 59, at 242.
82. See supra note 70.
83. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 554 (citation omitted).
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Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding
the Constitution; or conformably to the Constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence
of judicial duty." And the Chief Justice added that the
doctrine "that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution,
and see only the law," "would subvert the very foundation of
84
all written constitutions."

Fuller's use of the Marbury decision to justify the Court's action
was unprecedented. Never before in its history had the Court
deployed the Marbury decision to justify an exercise of judicial
review. Moreover, during the ninety-two years between Marbury
and Pollock, the Court had never once seen it necessary when
declaring a congressional statute unconstitutional to defend its
power to exercise judicial review by reference to the authority of an
earlier decision. In all prior cases, the Court merely asserted its
power to declare a congressional statute unconstitutional without
specifically citing case authority supporting that course of action.85
The Court's inaugural use of the Marbury decision to defend an
exercise of judicial review was saved for an extraordinarily
controversial decision in which the Court's judgment was highly
vulnerable to criticism. The Court thus began a pattern that would
continue in the twentieth century of citing Marbury and quoting
Chief Justice Marshall when the stakes were particularly high.86
The Pollock decisions were clearly among the most controversial
84. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
85. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893);
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); Trademark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879); United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1878); United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. R.R. Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1873);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 113 (1871); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870);
Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1870); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 603 (1870); The Alicia, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869); Reichart v. Felps,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160 (1868); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867);
Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865); Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
86. Moreover, after Pollock, the Court's use of judicial review to void
legislation sharply increased, particularly state statutes regulating private
economic activity. Between 1897 and 1937, the Court struck down 209 state
statutes on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, 176 of which were business
regulations, a sharp increase from the prior century. CLINTON, supra note 23,
at 207. By the same token, the Court struck down fifty-five congressional
statutes during the 1896-1936 time period, far more than during the Court's
first century. Id. The Court was particularly active declaring state and federal
statutes unconstitutional during the 1920s.
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decisions of the late nineteenth century,87 far more controversial
than Plessy v. Ferguson 88 the following term. 89 The decisions
provoked a strong "anti-Court" sentiment across the nation. As
historian Michael Kammen has noted, after 1895 "the Court ceased
to be sacred" in the minds of many Americans: "[o]nly in the wake of
Dred Scott had politicization of the Court been more severe, and
90
polarization over constitutional issues more sharp."
William
Howard Taft later commented that "[n]othing has ever injured the
91
prestige of the Supreme Court more" than the Pollock decisions.
For only the third time in the Court's history, popular reaction led to
a constitutional amendment reversing a Court decision. 92 Idaho
Senator William Borah predicted that if the proposed income tax
amendment failed, "the greatest war in history will be fought
87. In 1895, the Court issued two other decisions that also provoked a
public outcry: United States u. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), in which the
Court narrowly construed the Sherman Act to uphold the lawfulness of the
Sugar Trust, and In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), in which the Court upheld the
use of a labor injunction against labor leader Eugene Debs. These two
decisions, along with Pollock, caused many, in the words of one scholar, to view
the Court not as "a tribunal of justice, whose members sought their guidance
from the Constitution, the wisdom of the past, and the public conscience, but
instead a body of appointed men seeking to protect propertied interests by
rejecting the past and rigging the future." JOHN E . SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE
FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at
74 (1978).
88. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
89. As one scholar has noted, the Pollock decisions quickly became "a topic
of heated discussion in every bank, barbershop, and barroom in the nation."
Alan Furman Westin, The Supreme Court, The Populist Movement and the
Campaign of 1896, 15 J . POLITICS 3, 22 (1953); see also Jones, supra note 70, at
198 ("No case of recent times has occasioned so much discussion and notoriety
as that of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company . ...").
Press reaction to the Pollock decisions varied widely. The St. Louis
Post-Dispatch argued that "[t]o-day's decision shows that the corporations and
plutocrats are as securely intrenched in the Supreme Court as in the lower
courts which they take such pains to control." Quoted in Ellis, supra note 59, at
240. The New York Sun, on the other hand, claimed that "[t]he wave of
socialistic revolution has gone far, but it breaks at the foot of the ultimate
bulwark set up for the protection of our liberties." ld. at 241.
90. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 191-92 (1986).
91. Quoted in Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1999).
92. The Eleventh Amendment (1798) was promulgated specifically to
reverse the Court's decision in Chisholm u. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Multiple factors led to the promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868),
but the Court's decision in Dred Scott u. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
was certainly a primary one. The Pollock decision was reversed by the
Sixteenth Amendment (1913).
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around the wreck of the Supreme Court."93
During the election of 1896, both the Democrats and Populists
campaigned against the Court,94 evoking memories of the 1860
election in which the Court's Dred Scott decision had played an
important role. 95 The 1896 Democratic Party platform demanded a
curb on the Court's power to review the constitutionality of
congressional legislation. 96 Some called for the impeachment of
those justices comprising the Pollock majority. Sylvester Pennoyer,
a former Democratic-Populist governor of Oregon, attacked the
Pollock decisions in a series of articles in the American Law Review
in 1896, calling for "the impeachment of the nullifying judges of the
Supreme Court."97 Recognizing that Chief Justice Fuller had relied
upon Marbury (and Chief Justice Marshall) to justify the Court's
exercise of judicial review, Pennoyer attacked Marbury as an
unprincipled decision and Marshall for introducing 'judicial
oligarchy'':
Ever since 1803, when the Supreme Court assumed the right
to supervise the laws of Congress [citing Marbury], .. . we
have had a substituted government, under which Congress has
abrogated the exclusive prerogative of making laws conferred
upon it by the Constitution. We have, during this time, been
living under a government not based upon the Federal
Constitution, but under one created by the plausible
sophistries of John Marshall. . . . Our constitutional
98
government has been supplanted by a judicial oligarchy.

93. KAMMEN, supra note 90, at 202-03.
94. ld. at 191.
95. ROBERT K. CARR, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 258 (1942)
(The Republican platform of 1860 denounced the Dred Scott decision as a
"dangerous political heresy.").
96. KERMIT L. HALL, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1985). Historian Carl Degler has noted of the 1896
election: "The class consciousness and even class hatred that ran through the
speeches and literature of the presidential campaign of 1896 came close to
making Justice Field a prophet" for his prediction in his Pollock concurrence of
a "war of the poor against the rich." CARL DEGLER, THE AGE OF THE ECONOMIC
REVOLUTION 1876-1900, at 124 (1967).
97. Sylvester Pennoyer, A Reply to The Foregoing, 29 AM. L. REv. 856, 863
(1895) [hereinafter Pennoyer, A Reply].
98. Sylvester Pennoyer, The Income Tax Decision, and the Power of the
Supreme Court to Nullify Acts of Congress, 29 AM. L. REV. 550, 557-58 (1895)
(footnote omitted). Pennoyer made a similar claim in a subsequent article:
In the case of Marbury v. Madison, the foundation of a government
was laid, entirely different from that which was laid by the framers of
the constitution. With sophistical reasoning which may perhaps have
been equaled, but which certainly was never excelled, Chief Justice
Marshall educed a thesis changing our constitutional form of
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The Pollock decisions fueled a spirited debate among legal
scholars, lawyers, and politicians concerning the merits of judicial
review that would last well into the twentieth century. For many,
the Court's exercise of judicial review was a "usurpation" of
legislative authority;99 for others, a "charter of American liberty. "100
Defenders of judicial review utilized the 1901 celebration of the
centennial of John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice to
support their cause. 101 John Forrest Dillon, a sharp critic of the
income tax at issue in Pollock, put together a three-volume
collection of speeches delivered at Marshall commemoration
ceremonies across the country at the behest of U.S. Supreme Court
Justice George Shiras, a controversial member of the Pollock
majority. 102 Justice Shiras encouraged Dillon to take up the project
government in to a judicial oligarchy ....
Pennoyer, A Reply, supra note 97, at 862 (footnote omitted); see also Sylvester
Pennoyer, The Case of Marbury v. Madison, 30 AM. L. REv. 188, 201 (1896)
(criticizing "the usurpation by the Federal courts of the legislative power").
99. For example, in 1898, John Akin, president of Georgia Bar Association,
lamented the rise of judicial review in his annual address, referring to the
"frightful ghost of Marshallism" that has been "resurrected in the modern
Federal judiciary and stalks abroad unmasked." John W. Akin, Aggressions of
the Federal Courts, 32 AM. L. REv. 669, 696 (1898). Akin claimed that "the vast
majority of the people, and probably of the bar, believe that the Federal courts
have usurped powers not lawfully theirs .... " ld.; see also Camm Patteson, The
Judicial Usurpation of Power, 10 VA. L. REG. 855, 855 (1905) (claiming that "the
greatest danger which threatens the American republic is the judicial
usurpation of power").
100. CLINTON, supra note 23, at 14; see, e.g., Junius Parker, The Supreme
Court and Its Constitutional Duty and Power, 30 AM. L. REV. 357, 362 (1896)
(arguing that "(i]n times of political upheaval, of sectional animosity, of
Communistic uprising, the nine quiet men who spend their lives away from the
political field, free from the necessity of demagoguery, constitute ... the very
sheet-anchor of the institutions of our land").
101. Marshall Day celebrations, heavily promoted by the conservative
American Bar Association, were held in February 1901 in thirty-eight states
and the District of Columbia; ceremonies in the U.S. Capitol building were
attended by members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the diplomatic
corps. KAMMEN, supra note 90, at 209-10; 2 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL
SERVICES, supra note 3, at 124.
102. The vote in the first Pollock decision striking down the taxation of
income derived from real property had been six to two, but the Court had
divided four to four on the question of income derived from personal property
and so scheduled reargument. The tally of how each justice voted on the
personal property issue was not !lisclosed. Justice Jackson, absent from the
deliberations and vote in the first decision, was present for the reargument and
voted to sustain the tax as it pertained to income derived from personal
property. Given that four justices had voted earlier to sustain the tax with
respect to income from personal property, Jackson's vote appeared to provide a
fifth vote to sustain the tax. But the second Pollock decision declared the tax on
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so as to establish "a consensus of opinion concerning Marshall on the
part of eminent lawyers in all parts of the country."103 Dillon's threevolume set of speeches from Marshall Day celebrations provides a
fascinating snapshot of the emergence of both Marbury and
Marshall as important reference points in the defense of judicial
review, as well as the coming of age of Marbury as a "great case."
The Marshall commemoration became a convenient forum for
proponents of judicial review to appropriate Marshall's status to
their cause. In fact, Marshall Day speakers devoted considerably
more attention to Marbury than to any other Marshall opinion,
including McCulloch v. Maryland. 104 With the recent controversies
over the use of judicial review to protect private property from
Populist legislative encroachment clearly in mind, Dillon, in his
introduction to the three-volume set, asserted the profound
importance of Marbury:
And what a change Marshall wrought [in Marbury]! The
popular notions a century ago were deeply tinctured with the
doctrines and theories engendered by the French Revolutionthe supreme and uncontrollable right of the people to govern.
Marbury's Case opened a new chapter in the history of
constitutional governments. That decision said to Congress,
... "if you enact a law in conflict with the Constitution it is
utterly void, and the court, although only a co-ordinate
department, has the right under the Constitution so to decide,
and such decision is authoritative and final, binding
throughout the land upon States and people." ... Verily a new
charter of individual rights and liberties was here
. d .105
proc1mme

This rhetorical connection between Marbury and the protection
of liberty was deployed by other speakers as well. Georgia attorney
income derived from personal property unconstitutional on a five to four vote.
Thus, one justice, whose identity was unknown, changed his vote between the
first and second decisions. The culprit was widely believed to be Justice Shiras.
As historian Arnold Paul notes, "Shiras was soon subjected to an outpouring of
violent obloquy by the supporters of the income tax, furious that one man's
vacillation should have wrecked the whole tax." PAUL, supra note 51, at 214.
Historians have subsequently questioned whether in fact Shiras was the guilty
party. Id. at 215-16.
103. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at viii.
104. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In his introduction to the three-volume
set of Marshall speeches, Dillon commented on the substantial attention given
in those speeches to Marbury: "[i]t was inevitable that on Marshall Day
renewed attention should be called to the original and distinctively American
feature in our governmental polity which Jefferson called the judicial veto."' 1
LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at XX.
105. 1 id. at xviii.
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Burton Smith called the Marbury decision an "epoch in the world's
history" and a "bulwark of liberty and civilization, towering above
all others erected by the Anglo-Saxon race!" 106
Among the speeches celebrating Marshall's appointment in
Dillon's volumes was a lengthy one by a New York lawyer, Bourke
Cockran.
After lauding Marshall's decision in Marbury for
establishing "the most extraordinary feature of our political system,"
Cockran made the unsupportable claim that "[n)ever has the
Supreme Court exercised its supreme power of setting aside a law of
Congress or of a State that the people did not sustain its course with
substantial unanimity," 107 ignoring the fact that several of the
Court's recent exercises of judicial review, as in Pollock, had
provoked strong opposition. 108 Cockran went on to belittle legislative
bodies: "the close of the nineteenth century witnessed a decline in
the popularity of those parliamentary institutions which, at its
beginning, were universally believed to be the sure panacea for all
social or economic ills." 109 In contrast, Cockran extolled the
judiciary, describing it as the one branch of government "untainted
by any breath of suspicion, to which the people are so passionately
attached that the slightest attempt to disturb its independence or
even to review its decisions at the ballot box would be the ruin of the
political party suggesting it. "110 Though the legislative branch may
create conditions in which "industry languishes, prosperity withers,
civilization itself is imperiled," the people are safe, Cockran argued,
106. 2 id. at 122. See also supra text accompanying notes 3-5 for additional
comments about the Marbury decision offered at the Marshall Day celebrations.
107. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 416.
108. Other prominent defenders of judicial review also promoted the fiction
that its exercise was non-controversial. Joseph Choate, the attorney who
successfully challenged the federal income tax in the Pollock case, addressed a
London audience in 1903 while serving as the U.S. ambassador to the Court of
St. James on the role of the Supreme Court in the American constitutional
system. Choate claimed that although the Supreme Court since 1791 had
declared numerous state and federal statutes unconstitutional, "in each
instance there has been complete and peaceful acquiescence in the decision," a
claim contradicted by the adverse popular reaction to cases such as Dred Scott,
the Civil Rights Cases, and Pollock. Joseph H . Choate, The Supreme Court of
the United States: Its Place in the Constitution, 176 N. AM. REV. 927, 935-36
(1903).
109. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 416-17.
Cockran elaborated: "In this county [sic], representative bodies have not
escaped the disrepute which has overtaken them in other lands. With us
corruption is sometimes attributed to Congress, quite generally to State
legislatures, universally to municipal councils. . . . When Parliament is
supreme, corruption of legislative bodies undermines the life of the whole
State." 1 id. at 417-18.
110. 1 id. at 417.
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because of the courts and their willingness to embrace principles of
judicial review developed by Marshall in Marbury: ''while the courts
remain true to the example and precepts of Marshall, all the
essential rights of the citizen are as secure as the earth under his
feet-they can no more be invaded than the stars in heaven can be
blotted from his gaze."m
One cannot read these three volumes of tributes to Marshall
without being struck by the fact that a significant portion of the elite
American bar in 1901 now recognized the Marbury decision as
central to their defense of judicial review. Indeed, those eager to roll
back the tide of legislative excess deployed Marbury with
considerable rhetorical force. In the process, the profile of the
Marbury decision in the American legal consciousness soared; by the
early twentieth century, the decision ''had gained almost religious
acceptance" among conservative lawyers "because it said just what
they wanted to hear."112 Not surprisingly, some of the speakers at
the 1901 commemoration of Marshall's appointment suggested that
there be "another centennial in 1903 to celebrate Marbury v.
Madison properly."113
By the same token, the conservative bar sought to enhance John
Marshall's stature and to use that stature (along with his
authorship of Marbury) in the defense of judicial review. 114 Marshall
certainly enjoyed prominence throughout the nineteenth century, 115
111. 1 id. at 418. Cockran elaborated:
Has not the general welfare been promoted beyond the wildest hopes
of the fathers since the security of property encourages industry to
wring measureless abundance from a fruitful soil? Are not the
blessings of liberty . . . beyond fear of invasion or danger of
abridgement by the effective protection which the judiciary casts over
the essential rights of every citizen?
1 id. at 419.
112. DONALD 0. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL
BACKGROUND OF MARBURYV. MADISON 183 (1970).
113. Id. at 184. The conservative bar, in particular the American Bar
Association, also launched a "campaign of education" during the first decade of
the twentieth century whereby they attempted to "convince the public that
judges merely declare the law and have no part in the making of it." TWISS,
supra note 38, at 146. These efforts were meant to counteract the criticism of
Progressive critics of judicial activism. I d. at 146-47.
114. As Donald Dewey has noted, the "various celebrations in 1901 of the
centennial of John Marshall's appointment worshiped John Marshall and
judicial review as one." DEWEY, supra note 112, at 184.
115. As Michael Kammen has noted, "Marshall's prestige remained high"
during the nineteenth century, but "[e]ven so, he was not a cynosure of
attention during the half century following his death in 1835." KAMMEN, supra
note 90, at 209. Although a statue of Marshall was completed and presented to
the United States Supreme Court for display in 1884 and a Marshall biography
appeared in 1885, Marshall would not gain the lofty status that he enjoys today
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but as Kent Newmyer has noted, "Marshall's incorporation into the
conservative constitutional construct of the late nineteenth century
helped consolidate his mythic status."116 In the early years of the
twentieth century, Marshall's home in Richmond was saved from
destruction and given to the Association for the Preservation of
Virginia Antiquities which opened the home to the public in 1913 as
"a shrine of American constitutionalism."117 In his 1908 classic study
Constitutional Government, Woodrow Wilson called Marshall "[b]y
corrunon consent the most notable and one of the most statesmanlike
figures in our whole judicial history . . . ."118 Marshall enjoyed
considerably more attention from biographers during the early
twentieth century than he had during the nineteenth century; in
fact, with the publication of Albert Beveridge's magisterial fourvolume biography of Marshall during the second decade of the
twentieth century, the hagiography of the great Chief Justice was
complete. 119
The Supreme Court joined the 1901 celebration of both
Marshall and the Marbury decision. Several of the justices,
including Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Justices David Brewer
and Horace Gray, each a member of the Pollock majority, gave

until early in the twentieth century. Id.; see ALLAN B. MAGRUDER, JOHN
MARSHALL (1885).
116. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 473 (2001). But some contemporaries offered a different
construction of Marshall. New York lawyer Louis B. Boudin, in an important
1911 article in the Political Science Quarterly, argued that Marshall's greatness
lay not in his articulation of judicial review but in his expansive interpretation
of the powers of Congress:
In my opinion Marshall's great place in the history of our country is
due, not to any doctrine of the limitations of the legislative power,
which others deduced from that decision more than half a century
later and with but doubtful warrant, but to the liberal spirit in which
he interpreted, and thus helped to develop, the legislative powers of
Congress.
Boudin, supra note 12, at 256.
117. Quoted in KAMMEN, supra note 90, at 209.
118. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
158 (1908).
119. 1-4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (Vols. 1-2 1916,
Vols. 3-4 1919). In 1919, the distinguished political scientist Edward S. Corwin
published a favorable biography of Marshall, although Corwin criticized
Marshall's Marbury decision for declaring section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 unconstitutional.
EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A CHRONICLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1919). Corwin wrote of
Marshall: "Marshall established judicial review; he imparted to an ancient legal
tradition a new significance; he made his Court one of the great political forces
of the country; he founded American Constitutional Law ...." Id. at 230.
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Marshall Day speeches extolling Marbury and judicial review. 120
Fuller, in fact, addressed his remarks to a joint session of Congress,
the first time a Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
had ever done so. 121
In the meantime, the justices began to utilize the Marbury
decision with greater regularity to support exercises of judicial
review. For example in early 1901, as the nation commemorated
Marshall's appointment, Justice Brewer wrote an opinion in
Fairbank v. United States 122 in which the Court struck down another
federal tax on constitutional grounds. Early in his opinion for the
Court, Justice Brewer quoted at length from Marbury's discussion of
judicial review (which Brewer characterized as "forcibly declared by
Chief Justice Marshall") to justify the Court's actions. 123 A few
weeks later, Chief Justice Fuller wrote a dissenting opinion in
Downes v. Bidwell, 124 a case in which the Court sustained the
constitutionality of a federal statute governing Puerto Rico. Chief
Justice Fuller deployed Marbury to support his argument for an
exercise of judicial review: "[f]rom Marbury v. Madison to the
present day, no utterance of this court has intimated a doubt that
... the national government is a government of enumerated powers,
the exercise of which is restricted to the use of means appropriate
.. . to constitutional ends."12s Two years later, when the Court
declined in a narrow vote to hold unconstitutional a federal statute
prohibiting the movement of lottery tickets between states, Chief
Justice Fuller, writing for four dissenting justices, relied on
Marbury to support the argument that the Court should declare the
statute in question unconstitutional. 126 During the eight years since
Pollock, the Court's activist justices had helped solidify the
connection between Marbury and judicial review.
Thereafter, the Court would reaffirm this connection. In a 1911
120. Justice Gray, for example, gave considerable emphasis to Marbury ,
which he described as "[o]ne of the earliest and most important judgments of
Marshall." 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 66.
Chief Justice Fuller claimed that the Constitution "exclusively committed [to
the judiciary] the ultimate construction of the Constitution." 1 id. at 4.
121. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1399, 1412 (2002).
122. 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
123. Id. at 285-86.
124. 182 u.s. 244 (1901).
125. /d. at 359 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
126. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 372 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting)
("The Constitution gives no countenance to the theory that Congress is vested
with the full powers of the British Parliament, and ... is the sole judge of their
extent and application; and the decisions of this court from the beginning have
been to the contrary." (citing and quoting Marbury) ).
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opinion in which the Court found a congressional statute conferring
jurisdiction unconstitutional, Justice William Day asked: ''When
may this court ... pass upon the constitutional validity of an act of
Congress?"127 Answering for a unanimous Court, Day noted that
"[t]hat question has been settled from the early history of the court,
the leading case on the subject being Marbury v. Madison." 128 In
1926, Chief Justice William Howard Taft described the Marbury
decision as "one of the great landmarks in the history of the
construction of the Constitution of the United States, and is of
supreme authority . . . in respect to the power and duty of the
Supreme Court and other courts to consider and pass upon the
validity of acts of Congress ...."129
Constitutional law treatises published after 1900 bore a very
different quality with respect to judicial review and the importance
of Marbury in comparison with their nineteenth-century
predecessors. Almost without exception, the status of Marbury is
significantly elevated.
Most early twentieth-century treatises
devoted a separate section to a discussion of the case. For example,
University of Illinois law dean Albert Putney, in his 1908 treatise,
United States Constitutional History and Law, labeled the decision
in Marbury "among the most important ever rendered by the
Supreme Court"-a claim no nineteenth-century treatise could or
did make-and devoted a section of his treatise to a discussion of the
case. 130 Westel Willoughby, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins
University, opened his two-volume 1910 treatise, The Constitutional
Law of the United States, with a section on "The Courts and
Unconstitutional Laws," followed by a section on "Marbury v.
Madison." 131 University of Washington political scientist Charles
Martin published a 1928 text on the American Constitution; his
chapter ''The Power of the Supreme Court to Set Aside Acts of
Congress" was comprised entirely of a discussion of Marbury. 132
127. Muskrat v . United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911).
128. ld.
129. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 139 (1926).
130. ALBERT H. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW
§ 193 (1908).
131. 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 2-4 (1910).
132. CHARLES E. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND OF THE IDEALS UPON WHICH IT IS BASED WITH
ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS 111-13 (1928); see also 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION 754 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., 1899)
(Washington and Lee law professor John Tucker, in his posthumously published
1899 constitutional law treatise, grounded his discussion of judicial review in
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Constitutional law casebooks of the late nineteenth century
generally did not emphasize Marbury v. Madison. In his landmark
1894 constitutional law casebook, for example, Harvard law
professor James Bradley Thayer included Marbury as one of the
cases that his students would read on the topic "Written
Constitutions in the United States," but placed no special emphasis
on the decision. Thayer's students read an array of materials in
addition to Marbury that addressed judicial review, including four
state court decisions from the 1780s, Federalist Number 78, a
federal circuit court opinion from 1795, and the famous 1825
critique of judicial review by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice
John Gibson in Eakin v. Raub 133 which Thayer characterized as "the
ablest discussion of [judicial review] which I have ever seen."134 In
fact, in his landmark 1893 article in the Harvard Law Review on
American constitutional law, Thayer labeled Marbury an
"overpraised" decision. 135 Two years after Thayer published his 1894
casebook, University of Minnesota law professor John Day Smith
published another constitutional casebook in which he omitted the
Marbury decision altogether. 136
But those constitutional law casebooks published after the turn
of the twentieth century featured Marbury as a significant case.
Emlin McClain, Chancellor of the Law Department of the University
of Iowa, published a Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law in
1900; McClain's section on "Judicial Restraints on Legislative
Encroachments" was comprised entirely of the Marbury decision. 137
University of Chicago Law Dean James Parker Hall's 1913

"the masterly judgment of the great Chief Justice in the case of Marbury u.
Madison.").
One constitutional law treatise of the early twentieth century did not
give Marbury preeminent status in its discussion of judicial review. Ohio
attorney David Watson published a two-volume constitutional law treatise in
1910. Although Watson discusses "the great case of Marbury u. Madison" in the
context of a larger discussion of "Judicial Power Over Legislation," he does not
feature Marbury as the central case establishing the principle of judicial review.
2 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1182 (1910).
133. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-45 (Pa. 1825).
134. THAYER, supra note 11, at 48-206; Thayer, supra note 14, at 130 n.l.
135. Thayer, supra note 14, at 130 n.l.
136. JOHN DAY SMITH, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1896). But in 1898,
Chicago attorney Carl Evans Boyd did publish a constitutional law casebook
which opened with a chapter entitled "The Validity of Legislation" which was
comprised entirely of the Marbury decision. CARL EVANS BOYD, CASES ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17-25 (1898).
137. EMLIN MCCLAIN, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 815-18
(1900).
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casebook, Cases on Constitutional Law, featured Marbury in its
section on "Power to Declare Statutes Unconstitutional" following an
excerpt from the Federalist Papers. 138 Dean Hall's 1914 Illustrative
Cases on Constitutional Law opened its chapter on "Construction
and Interpretations of Constitutions" with the Marbury decision. 139
In 1916, the Harvard Government Department produced a volume
entitled Leading Cases on the Constitution of the United States for
use in teaching government classes at the university. The volume
included eighteen cases and began with Marbury v. Madison. 140
Finally, litigants challenging the constitutionality of legislation
before the Supreme Court in the early twentieth century featured
the Marbury decision in their briefing, a practice not followed in the
nineteenth century. 141 For example, in Adair v. United States, 142 a
case involving the constitutionality of a congressional statute
banning "yellow dog'' contracts, the petitioner included a section in
his brief entitled "The Duty of the Courts as to Unconstitutional
Acts of Congress" that featured a lengthy discussion of Marbury. 143
Litigants in several other early twentieth-century cases did
likewise. 144
138. JAMES PARKER HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WITH SUPPLEMENT
SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 28-31 (1913, 1926).
139. JAMES PARKER HALL, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-11
(1914).
140. LEADING CASES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1-6
(Harvard Univ. ed., 1916). For other examples, see Harvard Law Professor
Eugene Wambaugh's A Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law which
reproduced the Marbury decision in its inaugural chapter on "The Distinction
Between Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers," EuGENE WAMBAUGH, A
SELECTION OF CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-33 (1915), and Cornell
Government Professor Robert Cushman's Leading Constitutional Decisions in
which Cushman opened his chapter on "The Judiciary" with Marbury. ROBERT
EUGENE CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 155-61 (revised ed.
1929).
But not every early twentieth-century constitutional law casebook
treated Marbury in this fashion. Philadelphia attorneys H. Edgar Barnes and
Byron A. Milner published a constitutional law casebook in 1910. They
included Marbury, but in the section that addressed "The President's Power of
Appointment." H. EDGAR BARNES & BYRON A. MILNER, SELECTED CASES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31-36 (7th ed. 1924). St. John's University law professor
Maurice Finkelstein published a 1927 constitutional law treatise in which he
included Marbury in the section on "Political Questions."
MAURICE
FINKELSTEIN, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 88 (1927).
141. See supra note 68 for examples of nineteenth-century litigants that did
not rely on Marbury.
142. 208 u.s. 161 (1908).
143. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 43-44, Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908) (No. 293).
144. See Brief for Appellees at 56-57, Adkins v. Children's Hasp., 216 U.S.
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To be sure, many lawyers and scholars of the early twentieth
century continued to criticize both Marbury and the principle of
judicial review. 145 Moreover, between 1898 and 1921, Congress
considered six bills to limit the power of the Supreme Court,
including legislation that would have required a supermajority of
justices to invalidate legislation; between 1922 and 1924, Congress
considered eleven additional such bills. 146 At the same time, many
state legislatures provided for judicial recall and imposed
restrictions on judicial review. 147 But judicial review would survive
and over the course of the twentieth century would become an
increasingly prominent feature of the American constitutional
system.
IV.

MARBURY SINCE THE ONSET OF THEWARREN COURT

During the last half-century, aspects of the Marbury decision
have continued to come under sharp criticism from legal scholars. 148
But since the onset of the Warren Court, the Court has cited
Marbury for the principle of judicial review far more frequently than
at any comparable time in the Court's history. 149 Particularly when
525 (1923) (Nos. 795, 796) (citing Marbury for principle of judicial review); Brief
for Defendant-in-Error at 43-44, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20
(1922) (No. 657) (citing Marbury for the principle of judicial review); Brief on
the Part of the Plaintiff in Error at 35-37, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919) (No. 685) (quoting Marbury at length to support exercise of judicial
review).
145. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 55, at 49-69 (describing various critics of
judicial review during the first two decades of the twentieth century); Boudin,
supra note 12, at 248 (arguing in 1911 that the Constitution did not provide for
judicial review); Walter Clark, Some Myths of the Law, 13 MICH. L. REV. 26, 3031 (1914) (describing as a "myth" the notion that "courts have the power to set
aside an act of Congress, or of a state legislature" and that "[i]t has no validity
apart from the acquiescence or toleration which has been accorded it").
146. SEMONCHE, supra note 87, at 425.
147. For example, in the early twentieth century, five states amended their
constitutions to provide for judicial recall; Ohio amended its constitution to
provide that the Ohio Supreme Court could not declare a state statute
unconstitutional if more than one justice dissented. Clark, supra note 145, at
32.
148. For one of the more compelling and influential critiques of Marbury, see
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1969).
149. Justice Hugo Black, in particular, cited "the great opinion of Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury u. Madison" with great regularity. Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 223 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). Frequently,
when Black dissented from an exercise of judicial review, he would nevertheless
articulate his fidelity not merely to the principle of judicial review, but
specifically to Marshall's decision in Marbury. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
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the Court has engaged in (or declined to engage in) a controversial
exercise of judicial review, justices on both sides of the issue have
150
tended to cite Marbury as support for their position.
This
tendency to cite Marbury in high-profile cases shows no sign of
abating. In several of the most controversial exercises of judicial
review of the past decade, including United States v. Lopez, 151 City of
153
Boerne v. Flores, 152 and United States v. Morrison, the Court
U.S. 254, 274 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (in dissenting from Court's holding
that procedures in connection with termination of welfare benefits are
unconstitutional, Black affirms that "Marbury u. Madison held, and properly, I
think, that courts must be the final interpreters of the Constitution" (citation
omitted)); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 397 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
(in dissenting from Court's holding that a city charter violates the equal
protection clause, Black states that "[o)f course the Court under the ruling of
Marbury v. Madison has power to invalidate state laws that discriminate on
account of race" (citation omitted)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that though he disagreed with the
majority's use of judicial review to strike down the Connecticut birth control
law, "I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v. Madison, that our
Court has constitutional power to strike down statutes" (citations omitted)). In
fact, Black cited Marbury more frequently than any other member of the Court.
150. For example, in Garcia u. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528 (1985), an important Tenth Amendment decision, Justice Lewis
Powell dissented, arguing that the deference given by the majority to Congress
constituted a rejection of "the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from
federal overreaching" and disregard for "the teaching of the most famous case in
our history." Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (in dissenting from a
decision that Congress did not exceed its constitutional power in enacting the
Voting Rights Act, Rehnquist argued that "[w)hile the presumption of
constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of the Federal
Government or of one of the States, it is this Court which is ultimately
responsible for deciding challenges to the exercise of power by those entities.
Marbury u. Madison"); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971) (Court justifies
refusal to grant equitable relief against prosecution in state court under a state
statute of questionable constitutionality, noting that although judges have
"[t)he power and duty ... to declare laws unconstitutional" under Marbury,
"this vital responsibility ... does not amount to an unlimited power to survey
the statute books and pass judgment on laws before the courts are called upon
to enforce them.").
151. 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A)s the branch
whose distinctive duty it is to declare 'what the law is,' Marbury u. Madison, we
are often called upon to resolve questions of constitutional law not susceptible
to the mechanical application of bright and clear lines." (citation omitted)).
152. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("Congress' discretion is not unlimited ... and
the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury u. Madison, to
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution.").
153. 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000) ("No doubt the political branches have a
role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.").
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embraced Marbury in defense of its decision to strike down popular
congressional legislation. 154
But the Court during the past half century has deployed
Marbury for more ambitious purposes than merely to justify an
exercise of judicial review. In a number of cases, the Court has used
Marbury to justify the Court's assertion that its interpretations of
the Constitution are supreme over those of other governmental
actors, a claim that Marshall did not make in his Marbury decision.
This trend began in 1958, when the Court confronted open
defiance of its earlier decision in Brown v. Board of Education 155 by
governmental authorities in Little Rock, Arkansas, who resisted
implementation of a school desegregation decree and claimed that
they were not bound by the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Brown decision. In Cooper v. Aaron,156 the Court,
engaging in what many scholars have characterized as an expansion
of the meaning of Marbury, 157 relied on the decision to assert its
authority as the "supreme" interpreter of constitutional text:
[W]e should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor
and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the
Brown case. It is necessary only to recall some basic
constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine.
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution
as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,"
declared in the notable case of Marbury u. Madison that "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department

154. Justice Antonin Scalia captured the revered status that Marbury enjoys
on the current Court in his 1999 defense of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence in which he characterized critiques of that jurisprudence as
having been "rejected by constitutional tradition and precedent as clear and
conclusive, and almost as venerable, as that which consigns debate over
whether Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided to forums more otherworldly
than ours." Call. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. ,
527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999) (citation omitted).
155. 34 7 u.s. 483 (1954).
156. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
157. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 264 (1962) (criticizing the Court in
Cooper for claiming that "the Court and only the Court speaks in the name of
the Constitution"); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
25 n.155 (1964) (arguing that the Court in Cooper confused "Marshall's
assertion of judicial authority to interpret the Constitution [in Marbury] with
judicial exclusiveness").
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to say what the law is." This decision declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since
been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
158
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.

Since Cooper, the Court has repeatedly used Marbury to
reaffirm its claim to judicial supremacy. Most recently, in United
States v. Morrison, 159 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, in language
evocative of the Court's Cooper decision, announced: "No doubt the
political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the
Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the
ultimate expositor of the constitutional text."160
In politically charged cases taking the Court to the limits of its
authority, the Court has also utilized Marbury to legitimate its
actions. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 161 the Court
confronted the extraordinarily high-stakes task of assessing a claim
of executive privilege by the President of the United States in a case
that cut to the heart of the Nixon presidency. The Court noted that
the President interpreted the Constitution as granting him an
absolute privilege of confidentiality in all presidential
communications and conceded that such an interpretation was
entitled to great respect: "In the performance of assigned
constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially
interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by
any branch is due great respect from the others."162 Choosing to
reject that broad construction of presidential privilege, the Court
turned to Marbury for support: "Many decisions of this Court,
however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v.
Madison that '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."'163 Upon reviewing prior
cases in which the Court had held that federal courts must "on
occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the
construction given the document by another branch," 164 the Court
proceeded to "reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court
'to say what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege
presented in this case. Marbury v. Madison." 165
·
158. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17-18 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
159. 529 u.s. 598 (2000).
160. Id. at 617 n.7.
161. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
162. Id. at 703.
163. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
164. Id. at 704 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969)).
165. Id. at 705 (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
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Marbury's "icon" status has made it a fascinating rhetorical tool
in the hands of the justices contesting divisive cases, even ones that
have nothing to do with judicial review. For example, in 1978, a
divided Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services 166 that
local governments were "persons" for purposes of Section 1983
167
liability, a decision that reversed the Court's 1962 precedent in
168
Monroe v. Pape.
In dissent, then Justice Rehnquist complained of
the Court's abandonment of precedent and in particular, Justice
Lewis Powell's suggestion in a concurring opinion that Monroe was
owed less deference because the question of municipal liability "was
never actually briefed or argued in this Court" and resolution of that
issue was not "necessary to resolve the contentions made in that
case." 169 "Private parties must be able to rely upon explicitly stated
holdings of this Court," Rehnquist chided his colleagues, ''without
being obliged to peruse the briefs of the litigants to predict the
likelihood that this Court might change its mind."170 To bolster his
argument, Rehnquist cleverly suggested that the Court's decision
and Powell's rationale left the venerable Marbury decision
vulnerable to reversal:
To cast such doubt upon each of our cases, from Marbury v.
Madison forward, in which the explicit ground of decision "was
never actually briefed or argued," (Powell, J., concurring),
would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the law. Indeed,
in Marbury itself, the argument of Charles Lee on behalf of the
applicants . . . devotes not a word to the question of whether
this Court has the power to invalidate a statute duly enacted
171
by the Congress.

Finally, Chief Justice Marshall's language in Marbury that
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he

166. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
167. Id. at 662-63.
168. 365 u.s. 167 (1961).
169. Monell, 436 U.S. at 708-09 (Powell, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 718 (citations omitted). In a similar vein, Justice Scalia, in his
dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U .S. 833 (1992), criticized as
"contrived" the plurality's use of stare decisis pursuant to which it retained only
the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade. Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia
questioned whether the plurality's analysis might affect the Court's decision in
Marbury: "I wonder whether, as applied to Marbury v. Madison, for example,
the new version of stare decisis would be satisfied if we allowed courts to review
the constitutionality of only those statutes that (like the one in Marbury )
pertain to the jurisdiction of the courts." I d. (citation omitted).
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receives an injury"172 has been used by various justices to justifY the
establishment of private rights of action under constitutional
provisions173 or to criticize the Court for refusing to provide a remedy
for a constitutional violation where no specific remedy has been
174
provided by a coordinate branch of government.

172. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
173. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) (holding that the
plaintiff has a private right of action under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to sue a Member of Congress for sex discrimination, quoting Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury that "[t)he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that the plaintiff
has a private right of action under the Fourth Amendment, quoting Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury).
Justices critical of implied rights of action have also used Marbury to
defend their position. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979),
Justice Powell dissented from the Court's finding a private right of action under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, noting that:
[w)hile '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,' Marbury v. Madison, it is
equally-and emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress
not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and
projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation.
ld. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95
(1978) (citation omitted)).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 978 & n.36 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to evidence seized by officers relying on a warrant that is
subsequently determined to be defective; arguing that the Court should not
"concede the existence of a constitutional violation for which there is no
remedy," and quoting Marbury to the effect that "[t)he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury"); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S.
339, 359 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that
even if a judge engaged in unconstitutional racial discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury foreman, dismissal of indictment is unwarranted;
accuses the Court of refusing to apply the "elementary, though oft-ignored,
principle that every right must be vindicated by an effective remedy" (citing
Marbury)); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 368 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's holding that police officers have absolute immunity from
damages for perjured testimony at a criminal trial, quoting Marbury to the
effect that "[t)he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protections of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury"); Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 656 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that plaintiff has no cause of action
for abuse of subpoena power by federal officer, citing Marbury v. Madison for
"the settled principle of the accountability, in damages, of the individual
governmental officer for the consequences of his wrongdoing").

2003]

EMERGENCE OF A "GREAT CASE"

413

V. CONCLUSION
Marbury v. Madison is now nndisputably one of "the great
cases" of American constitutional law, nndeniably associated with
the principle of judicial review. 175 But Marbury's greatness cannot
be attributed to the pathbreaking character of the decision. Rather,
Marbury has become great because, over the years, proponents of an
expansive doctrine of judicial review have needed it to assume
greatness.

175. As one historian of the Marbury decision has noted: "Right or not,
flawed or not, Marbury u. Madison has become the symbol of American judicial
review ... . How long (judicial review] will survive ... will depend on the use
which judges of the future will make of the power for which Marbury u.
Madison has been the rationalization and symboL" DEWEY, supra note 112, at
185-86.

